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Constructing Transnational Solidarity: The Role of Campaign Governance 
Abstract 
Our inductive study of two transnational labour solidarity efforts focuses on the role of campaign 
governance. Specifically, we study contrasting campaign strategies, tactics, and coalition 
structures in campaigns by two global union federations, the UNI and the IUF, contextualised in 
terms of how these campaigns unfolded in India. Our contribution consists of two arguments. The 
first is that a degree of internal consistency amongst different campaign elements is important for 
success, and the second is that a mode of articulation that allows for local concerns in affiliate 
countries to find voice in global campaigns is more likely to result in concrete gains at the local 
level. 





Transnational labour solidarity (more commonly referred to as labour transnationalism) 
has been the subject of scholarly interest for almost a century, even though calls for it originated 
even earlier (e.g. Marx and Engels, 1848). Early research during the first half of the 20th century 
highlighted the need and rationale for labour transnationalism (e.g. Fimmen 1924, Lorwin 1953).  
The latter half of the 20th century evinced a number of important contributions that reprised and 
extended early literature. Notable contributions include those of Logue (1980), who specified the 
conditions under which national unions would internationalise; the early works of Waterman 
(1998) and Munck (1988), which emphasised the (renewed) need for labour to come together to 
counteract the power of global capital; the argument of Levinson (1972), advocating the 
development of transnational collective bargaining as an effective response to the pressures from 
multinationals on host country workforces; Ramsay’s (1997, 2000) suggestion that labour 
internationalism needs to be variegated since MNCs in different industries follow different 
strategies and are structured differently, and the various writings of Hyman (e.g. 2002, 2005) on 
union internationalisation strategies.  
 The 2000s produced more empirical scholarship rooted in the arguments that are noted 
above. The edited works of Harrod and O’Brien (2002), Gordon and Turner (2002), and 
Bronfenbrenner (2007), for example, provided evidence regarding a few successful cases of labour 
transnationalism and identified important barriers to success in failed cases. The latest wave of 
research has struck a more positive note, with scholars highlighting over 115 global framework 
agreements (GFAs)1 which have been signed as evidence of the success of labor transnationalism. 
In addition, there has been an increase in nuanced research on cross-border solidarity cases that 
 
1 The paper uses a number of abbreviations (such as GFAs) and we provide, in appendix 2, a complete list of those 
used.  
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has shed light upon the conditions under which GFAs signed at the global level may or may not 
result in specific improvements at the local level (Anner et al, 2006; Fichter and McCallum, 2015; 
Brookes and McCallum, 2017; Niforou, 2012; Greer and Hauptmeier, 2008). Yet, notes of 
pessimism persist, exemplified by Waterman’s (2014) critique that European unions are still 
trapped in an “iron cage” of nationality which prevents successful transnational solidarity.  
 To provide some order to this vast literature, Brookes and McCallum (2017) divide it into 
two strands. The first, more theoretical strand, casts labour transnationalism as a countermovement 
to re-shape global capitalism, while the empirical strand examines individual cases of transnational 
labour solidarity. As Niforou (2015) suggests, the empirical strand is quite varied, as it is informed 
by a variety of disciplinary approaches, such as geography, sociology, political science, 
economics, and law. It is also varied in terms of its focus on different facets of labour 
transnationalism, such as why GFAs do not result in meaningful gains at the local level, or the 
roles of supranational institutions such as European Works Councils, as noted in Barrientos and 
Smith, (2007); Riisgaard and Hammer, (2011); Davies, Hammer and Wiliams (2011); Williams, 
Davies and Chinguno (2013). The units of analysis in this strand are also diverse, including 
movements, campaigns, bilateral alliances, multi-lateral alliances, global union federations 
(GUFs), global value chains, and of course, global framework agreements.  
Brookes and McCallum (2017:208) suggest that this cacophony of case studies on labour 
transnationalism from diverse disciplines offer “more trees than forest”. They call for researchers 
to conceptualise more clearly and consistently what labour transnationalism is, develop clear 
criteria for categorising the wide range of observed “types” of labour transnationalism, and identify 
which instances of it are directly comparable (whether small N comparative case studies or large 
N quantitative analyses), in order to advance our understanding and develop theory. In a similar 
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vein, Anner et al. (2006) argue that more systematic and “contextualised comparisons” are needed 
between what may seem to be “apples and oranges”, in order to synthesise diverse single industry 
case studies. 
In these studies, the meaning of “success” in labour transnationalism is also varied. 
Brookes and McCallum (2017) note the difficulty of comparing more established and stable 
transnational alliances which do very little in local contexts, with others that are more ephemeral, 
yet capture the excitement of a social movement. Brookes (2013) provides a useful definition of 
success that has the potential to move the field forward. For her, a successful case of labour 
transnationalism is one in which at least one partner in the alliance must obtain some material 
benefits (such as higher wages and better working conditions) or strategic gains (collective 
bargaining rights). 
This article contributes to the literature by drawing lessons for sustainable labour 
transnationalism, taking into account the need for more contextualised comparisons.  Specifically, 
ours is an inductive study of two transnational labour solidarity efforts. These are the campaigns 
by two global union federations, UNI Global Union (UNI) and the International Union of Food, 
Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and Allied Workers Associations (IUF), 
contextualised in terms of how these campaigns unfolded in India. We are specifically comparing 
the effectiveness of two different forms of governance in transnational solidarity efforts: ‘top 
down’ versus ‘bottom up’.  Both campaigns evidence contrasting successes. The UNI’s global 
campaign against G4S, a British multinational security services company, was a top down 
campaign that resulted in the signing of a GFA, which was successfully implemented in South 
Africa, but did not result in concrete strategic or material gains in India. The IUF’s campaign 
against Nestlé, a Swiss-owned multinational food and beverage company, in contrast, was a 
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bottom up campaign that did NOT result in the signing of a GFA, and yet resulted in both material 
and strategic gains via increased wages and plant level collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) 
in India.  
Our study sheds light on the importance of campaign governance as a key variable in the 
development of transnational solidarity that results in success locally. Our central argument is that 
the way in which campaigns are articulated determines success. Specifically, we argue that a mode 
of articulation that allows for local concerns in affiliate countries to find voice in global campaigns 
tends to result in concrete gains at the local level. Such an articulation in governance requires a 
degree of internal consistency amongst campaign elements including global campaign design, the 
creation of local coalition structures, campaign strategies, tactics, and post-campaign activities.  
In making this argument, this study contributes to extant literature in several ways. We 
respond specifically to Niforou’s (2015) observation that there is a dearth of studies on micro-level 
and bottom up approaches, which are essential because global governance is fundamentally multi-
level. We provide some empirical evidence to McCallum’s (2013) suggestion that global 
campaigns are the outcome of both top-down and bottom-up approaches. We also respond to calls 
by Brookes and McCallum (2017) and Anner et al (2006) for more contextualised comparisons. 
But our key contribution to the labour transnationalism literature is our argument that articulation 
leads to local success, and evidence of the relationship between different elements of a campaign.  
 
Germane Literature 
Given our relatively narrow focus on campaign governance in labour transnationalism, our 
review of relevant literature will necessarily be more narrowly focused.  For those interested in the 
broader conceptual labour transnationalism literature, we refer readers to key earlier works (e.g., 
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Fimmen (1924), Lorwin (1953), Levinson (1972), Logue (1980) and the more recent writings of 
of Waterman (1998, 2014) and Hyman (2005, 2007). For recent reviews of the empirical labour 
transnationalism literature, we refer readers to Brookes and McCallum (2017), Niforou (2014, 
2015) and Ford and Gillan (2015). Our objective in this brief review of germane literature is to 
focus on what we know, theoretically and empirically, about “governance” in labour 
transnationalism. 
As far as governance in labour transnationalism is concerned, scholars seem to agree that 
there has been a general shift from an older form to a newer one. The old form, summarised in 
Burawoy (2010), is “typically run by career bureaucrats, in a central hierarchical organization, 
with restricted debate, a diplomatic orientation, focusing only on unions that are established by 
Northern male white workers”. This is similar to Hyman’s (2005) “bureaucrat model” of 
international unionism. Examples of scholarship in this vein can be seen in the works of Gordon 
and Turner (20000, Stevis and Boswell (2008), and Bronfenbrenner (2007). The new form of 
governance in labour transnationalism is characterised by several features such as leadership by a 
new generation of activists, linkages between decentralised networks, more open debate within the 
transnational movement, a mobilisational and campaign orientation including coalition building 
with social movements, a central focus on solidarity, and with more participation by workers from 
the Global South. This new form is similar to Hyman’s (2005) “agitator” model of unionism. 
There is debate about the impact of this new form, however. On the one hand, there are 
sceptics like Burawoy (2010), Niforou (2012, 2014), and Brookes (2013), who question whether 
unions have truly been able to build transnational solidarity, whether global campaigns improve 
working conditions in the global south, and whether GFAs signed at the global level can be 
implemented at local levels.  On the other hand, there are some who see promise in GFAs signed 
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with multinationals, such as Egels-Zandén and Hyllman (2007) and Cotton and Gumbrell-
McCormick (2012). McCallum (2013) argues, “workers who have the support of a global 
campaign behind them are necessarily more powerful in facing down global corporations”.  Some 
empirical studies have addressed the extent to which this promise is actually realised, focusing on 
the relative importance of global versus local factors, and questioning whether ‘one size fits all’ 
approaches are realistic for the successful implementation of GFAs. But, as these studies do not 
necessarily focus on the governance of labour transnationalism, we do not review them here. 
Examples can be found in Niforou (2012, 2014), Wills (2002), Riisgaard (2005), (Fichter, Helfen 
and Sydow (2011), Egles-Zanden (2007), Cumbers, Nativel, and Routledge (2008), Lillie (2005), 
Brookes (2013) and Anner, Greer, Hauptmeier, Lillie and Winchester (2006).  
Regarding governance specifically, there is debate regarding top down and bottom up 
approaches.  One question concerns local involvement in global campaigns to sign GFAs. Fichter 
and McCallum (2015: 67-69) pointed to “the inherent shortcomings of a negotiation process 
dominated by social partnership” in the headquarters of MNCs generally based in Europe where 
institutional structures facilitate such agreements. They suggest that social dialogue “is less useful 
for implementing GFAs”, and hence, GFAs arising from a social partnership approach tend to be 
“top-down” and remain “still-born”, whereas GFAs arising out of a broader mobilisation of 
workers will likely have a better record of implementation. Whether such a top down approach is 
effective or not echoes a much older debate about the trade-offs between oligarchy and democracy 
(Michels 1911). As Hyman (2007) suggests, global strategies tend to be determined by structures 
at a central level, which is generally the case in GUFs, which are situated primarily in Europe. 
However, GUFs are also federations of their global affiliates, and “union democracy requires 
adequate scope for different categories of members to shape the priorities of their organisations” 
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(p199), which in turn calls for wider participation. Yet, to go too far down the democracy route 
poses risks to global strategy formulation and implementation.  Hyman cites Streeck’s (1988:312) 
observation that “a “pluralist” multitude of small, narrowly based collective action units, 
competing with each other for organizational resources and political influence” lack “a capacity to 
deliberate and control the macro-level outcomes of their action”. Thus, the only solution then is 
the proper articulation between the local, national and international levels, which requires 
“authoritative leadership” (Hyman 2007:199).  
 McCallum (2013) emphasises that linking global labour campaigns and local union 
revitalisation argues for a shift away from a top-down perspective without surrendering to a totally 
bottom-up angle, suggesting that change must come from the global grassroots. This is essentially 
the (unresolved) tension that GUFs face in articulating and implementing a global strategy. An 
outcome of the above debate is that it may result in “governance struggles” (McCallum 2013), i.e. 
there are ways for global unionism to empower workers locally, but these generally occur at a level 
far removed from the local workplace, and often through activities of GUFs.  
One factor that determines the ability of GUFs to successfully manage this tension 
concerns the degree of affiliate involvement in global alliances and affiliates’ integration into 
GUFs’ governance structures -- often measured by the national composition of GUF staff and 
functionaries, as found in Croucher and Cotton (2009), Lecher, Platzer, Rub, and Weiner (2001),  
Pulignano (2006), and Anner et al. (2006). Hyman’s ideas highlight the need for GUFs to strike a 
balance between global priorities and local goals in strategy formulation, advocating for structures 
that permit coordination to achieve global goals. Fichter and McCallum (2015) argue that, where 
local workers and their unions are actively involved in a campaign, they are far more able to 
enhance their bargaining power in a local setting. This debate would suggest that the ability of the 
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GUFs to effectively execute their strategic plans requires them “to play a facilitation and 
coordination role” rather than directing the implementation of strategy from “above” (Ford and 
Gillan 2015:458). Thus, while the above literature highlights the need for GUFs to strike a balance 
between global priorities and local goals in strategy formulation, it equivocates on striking a 
similar balance in implementation, which is contingent on local institutional employment relations 
configurations. Clearly then, from a governance perspective, how global campaigns are articulated 
locally is a key element which requires further investigation. 
So, what do we know about governance in the local articulation of global campaigns? A 
limited number of empirical studies address the issue, albeit not quite directly. Cotton and Royle 
(2014) study the relationship between the International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and 
General Workers Unions (ICEM) and one of its affiliates (Sintracarbon) in Columbia in their 
campaign against a mine owned by Anglo-American. Their study of the ICEM and Sintracarbon 
relationship shows a deliberative stage-wise process. This process began with collaborative 
projects on mining safety, followed by educational programs to build affiliate capacity, training of 
a new generation of union leaders, and integrating those leaders into GUF structures. Thereafter, 
networking events with other unions in the region was necessary before Sintracarbon was able to 
begin a formal process of dialogue with employers that resulted in the successful organization of 
contract workers in the Colombian mining industry. Niforou (2014), adopting a global governance 
perspective in her study of the implementation of GFAs in two cases (Endesa and Telefonica), 
highlights the difficulties in successfully using GFA provisions for local union organization and 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes. She suggests that, had local actors been involved, 
the representation problems noted in the Endesa GFA would have been addressed. In the 
Telefonica case as well, the lack of collective ownership of the GFA, especially by managements 
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and unions in the affiliate countries, accounted for local union inertia in proactively using the GFA 
to enforce compliance locally. In a different arena, observing the low level of compliance of 
suppliers with retailers’ codes of conduct, Egels-Zanden (2007) suggests that increasing the role 
of affiliates with strong local presence in the monitoring process can improve the situation. 
Anner et al. (2006) point to the importance of developing structures for effective 
transnationalism. In the maritime industry, the unions had built industry level structures for 
transnational solidarity, but in the auto sector, the insularity of national unions prevented the 
achievement of the transnational objective. This is akin to Logue’s (1980:21) thesis highlighting 
the inverse relationship between trade union control over its national environment and its 
involvement in international activity. Their study is important in that it highlights the need to 
effectively structure campaigns in ways that encompass local actors.  
Apart from structures, the ‘identity work’ of union leaders can help sustain labor 
transnationalism at different local levels.  In a case of transnational collective action in the auto 
industry under the aegis of a European Works Council, Greer and Hauptmeier (2008) show that 
the way in which top union leaders framed problems and interests had a substantial effect on the 
development of shared norms, which resulted in the building of social ties and trust that facilitated 
the mobilisation of workers in different countries. Such ties were instrumental in overcoming the 
situation where workers in different European countries faced conflicting material interests.  
It is possible to encompass the lessons from these limited empirical studies into more recent 
conceptual views. Levesque and Murray (2010) argue that successful transnationalism requires 
the right mix of power resources and strategic capabilities. They suggest that a key power resource 
concerns how unions create internal solidarity. This refers broadly to the building of collective 
identities to create cohesion. More specifically, Levesque and Murray (2010) allude to the notion 
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of “deliberative vitality”, which involves the degree and quality of participation of members and 
affiliates in decision making through governance structures and participative mechanisms. A 
second power resource involves the building of vertical solidarity, involving linkages between 
local, industrial, national, and international levels, and horizontal solidarity involving linkages 
with other organizations and social movements. In a similar vein, Gumbrell-McCormick and 
Hyman (2013) highlight the need for unions to build discursive, coalitional, and strategic power 
to counter the decline in traditional sources of power due to globalisation. Levesque and Murray’s 
“strategic capabilities” include the notion of framing, which is the development of an “overarching 
narrative as a frame of reference for action” (2010:343), similar to Greer and Hauptmeier’s (2008) 
‘identity work’ or Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman’s “discursive power”. It also includes 
articulating, which concerns how unions arbitrate between actions across different levels, time, 
and space. This might require, for example, the development of “glocal” actions (that are 
simultaneously global and local), or involve scaling up local issues to a larger context (Tarrow 
2005). 
Niforou (2014) argues in her study of labour leverage in global value chains, that successful 
labour transnationalism must recognise that governance is inherently multi-level, and that 
interdependencies across levels shape labour’s leverage. This requires the need for more horizontal 
and vertical linkages, and a greater focus on understanding micro level bottom up responses from 
the local level. Overall, she suggests that transnational union networks have been characterised by 
a democratic deficit, evidenced by their weakness in incorporating and accommodating different 
local members’ interests, which detracted from their ability to generate a sense of collective 
identity. And both De Neve (2008) and Niforou (2012) suggest that an understanding of local 
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interests is crucial especially given that differences in political trajectories and ideologies can 
affect organising at the local level.  
The empirical and conceptual studies mentioned above commonly highlight global-local 
relations in a way that serves as a useful “point of departure” for our investigation. We unearth   
through our inductive approach an articulation i.e.  how global strategies, intermediate structures, 
and local strategies interact in two global campaigns in India by two different GUFs. In so doing, 
we attempt to answer Brooke’s and McCallum’s call for drawing more comparisons to generate 
middle range theories relevant to labour transnationalism. 
 
Context and Methodology 
Context 
In order to engage in a contextualised comparison, we compare global campaigns in India 
by the IUF and UNI, two GUFs that have been engaged in several global campaigns. In India, their 
affiliates have grown from 9 and 4 in the late 1990s respectively, to 36 and 15 by 2015. The two 
campaigns studied here are the IUF’s global campaign against the multinational Nestle, and the 
UNI’s global campaign against G4S plc, the world’s largest security services company. 
The two global campaigns differed in their origins. The IUF’s “Stop Nespressure” 
campaign originated after Nestlé’s refusal of the IUF’s demand to extend recognition of unions 
beyond Europe, in order to counter labour rights violations by Nestlé in the developing world. In 
India, the campaign focused primarily on Nestlé’s refusal to recognise unions and bargain 
collectively in its Indian operations. Space limitations in this paper militate against detailed 
descriptions of this global campaign. However, detailed coverage can be found in Croucher and 
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Cotton (2009), Garver, Buketov, Chong, and Martinez (2007), Rutters (2003), White (2006), and 
Gallin (2008). 
The UNI’s global campaign had its origins in the ‘Justice for Janitors’ campaign in the US 
by the US based Service Employees International Union (SEIU), one of UNI’s largest affiliates. 
The consolidation of the global security industry led SEIU and UNI to launch a global campaign 
to organise security workers. In the developing world, this campaign focused heavily after 2006 
in South Africa, Indonesia, and India. The goal of the campaign was to sign a GFA with G4S, 
while making local efforts to organize security guards in India. More detailed descriptions and 
analyses of this campaign can be found in the works of McCallum (2013) and Evans (2014).  
Both global campaigns ended during 2008-09. By Brookes’ (2013) definition of success, 
both were successful, but in different ways. The UNI’s campaign resulted in the signing of a global 
framework agreement in 2008, and a partial organisation of security guards in India, although as 
McCallum has demonstrated, which our investigations confirm, none of the security workers’ 
unions formed by UNI’s affiliate in India had been recognised by G4S India management and no 
CBAs had been signed when we collected data for this paper in 2015.   The IUF’s campaign, which 
stopped in 2008, did not result in a global framework agreement, but in India, the campaign 
resulted in successful organisation of unions at five of Nestle Indian factories that are now covered 
by CBAs. Thus, there is global success in one case and local success in the other. 
Both campaigns occur in a context where union organising is not simple. On the one hand, 
India is a democracy with established labour institutions, well-developed labour legislation in the 
formal sector, and a relatively easy union formation processes, all of which create conditions 
favorable to new union organising. On the other hand, the absence of laws regarding union 
recognition, lax enforcement of legislation, and a neo-liberal tilt after liberalisation in 1990 has 
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legitimised employer opposition to unions, providing for a difficult terrain for organising. In 
addition, the multiplicity of unions, each affiliated to a different political party, creates unhealthy 
inter-union competition, which Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) term “involuted pluralism”.  The 
industrial context also imposes different challenges. It is arguably much easier to organise regular 
manufacturing workers in Nestle factories, since industrial establishments provide a degree of 
social cohesion amongst workers that helps collective action. In contrast, the highly dispersed 
nature of work in the security industry, where security guards are contract workers farmed out to 
different employers and establishments makes union organizing far more difficult. Besides, there 
are significant differences in protective legislation. Contract workers such as security guards are 
covered under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970, which is less protective 
compared to the Trade Unions Act 1926 and Industrial Disputes Act 1948 applicable to factory 
workers. Thus, contextual issues such as industrial sector and laws could explain the different 
outcomes in these two cases. Nevertheless, we argue in this paper that there is also a role for 
campaign governance in explaining outcomes, specifically the processes involved in how global 
campaigns are articulated locally. 
Methods 
Our methods involved the detailed analysis of information from the archives of GUFs, 
information published on their websites regarding campaigns, prior literature, and a series of 
interviews between 2012 and 2015. Our sampling strategy regarding who to interview was 
purposeful and opportunistic. We decided to interview union officials involved in strategic global 
campaign decisions at the GUF level, union officials at the intermediate coalition structures level 
who mediate between global and local strategies, and local union representatives and activists who 
implemented strategy on the ground.  
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Accordingly, the first author interviewed one senior official at each GUF to understand 
their global strategies. Within each GUF, he interviewed three officers at the intermediate 
campaign structures created by the GUFs in India, responsible for campaign rollout. Further, 29 
in-depth unstructured interviews were conducted with six union activists (three from each GUF), 
four and two worker representatives from Nestlé and G4S respectively, three affiliate union 
representatives belonging to each GUF, four officers each from country outreach offices and 
liaison councils, and three country experts (see Appendix 1 for a complete list of key interviewees). 
In addition, discussions were held with a variety of international academics who work in this area. 
Each interview took about three hours, and most were audio-taped. The interview data was 
transcribed and analysed using MAXQDA software.  
Our investigation is necessarily one-sided, given that both G4S-India and Nestlé-India 
management refused to meet with us. However, a plethora of literature suggests that in the global 
South, both companies have a history of resisting unionisation efforts. In the case of G4S, 
McCallum (2013) and Fichter and McCallum (2015) document this claim based on detailed 
interviews in the field as well as on archival reports. In the case of the Nestle, Phillip Mattera 
(2010), the research director of Good Jobs First, (a watchdog group), documents Nestlé’s union 
resistance primarily based on archival research, especially on research reports about Nestle 
published by the Fair Labor Association, Greenpeace, Facing Finance, and in several other 
publications. White (2006: 102), an investigative journalist, provides evidence of Nestlé’s union 
avoidance activities in the Global South, which included the use of contingent labour and “artificial 
promotion of workers into managerial positions and thereby excluding them from union 
membership”. And Mattera (2010) concluded in his study “though the company has good relations 
with unions representing its relatively small domestic workforce, its foreign labour record is less 
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harmonious especially in the Global South”. Two quotes sum up these strategies for both 
companies. McCallum (2013:7) suggests “Per its corporate southern strategy to achieve higher 
profit margins, G4S lay extra emphasis on its non-union operations in the Global South”, while 
Mattera (2010:2) argues “where weak legislation sanctions union busting, Nestle is not averse to 
busting unions”. 
The major themes that emerged from the data analysis are GUF expansion strategies 
generally, their history in India, the design of campaign structures, global-local relations, local 
organising strategies, tactics, and post campaign activities, which are described below.  
Results 
We organise the presentation of our results based on the themes that emerged out of our 
examination of the cases.  
GUF Global Expansion Strategies: The two GUFs differed in terms of the relative importance of 
a regional focus in their global expansion strategies. The IUF states on its website that their focus 
is on ‘strengthening affiliates through building solidarity in the global supply-chain with the help 
of cross-border campaigns in order to exert influence on multinationals for international 
recognition and collective bargaining’ (IUF website, 2013). As Croucher and Cotton (2009:65) 
note, IUF has been focused more closely in “securing union recognition and bargaining rights”. 
Realising that membership growth is likely to come from developing countries, IUF felt it 
necessary to ‘bond’ with affiliates along the forward and backward linkages in local supply chains 
in India. Rutters (2003) of the Freidrich Ebert Stiftung, (a German Foundation) suggests that in 
developing countries, IUF has achieved a high measure of mobilization by improving the 
representation of trade union interests at the national level, and asserting influence at the local 
level. Hence, the goal of the IUF campaign was primarily local (improving union density and 
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collective bargaining in India), and secondarily (viewed from India) to enter into a GFA. This 
focus on using a global campaign to emphasise local gains differs from that of the UNI. 
Formed in 2000 as a merger of four major global unions of service sector workers, UNI’s 
strategy focuses on global organising by forming sector-based global-unions that seek to protect 
core labour standards internationally through negotiating GFAs (Hammer, 2005). As Fichter et al. 
(2011) suggest, UNI’s primary goal was to sign a GFA, expecting that a change in the “rules” as 
McCallum (2013) suggests, would then trickle down into collective bargaining successes locally. 
The differing foci, i.e., one on local collective bargaining and the other on GFA’s likely account 
for differences noted below in how campaigns are carried out. 
History in India: The IUF first engaged in India when it was called to assist unionised employees 
of Unilever’s Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever, to fight the company’s unfair labour practices 
beginning in 1990. The issue was settled successfully in 2004, via a CBA. This 15-year effort 
resulted in the formation of an IUF-India outreach office (IUF-IOO) led by experienced organisers 
of the Hindustan Lever Employees Union (HLEU). IUF-IOO then expanded its focus to the entire 
supply chain of Hindustan Lever, including firms in plantation, agriculture, and diary. IUF-IOO’s 
National Officer of Supply Chain explained that “a campaign engaging with a beer manufacturing 
firm like SABMiller in India involves contract farmers producing barley, the raw material 
(upstream), as well as salespersons selling beer in retail outlets (downstream), alongside the 
factory workers producing beer” (Interview IUF-2). A flexible affiliation structure allowed IUF to 
pull together apolitical NGOs alongside politically affiliated and independent unions. This 
naturally required a bottom-up incorporation of multiple stake-holders’ concerns into their 
strategy. IUF-IOO was led by the then General Secretary of HLEU, a company union not affiliated 
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to political parties (unlike many Indian unions). Thus, IUF had a well-established strategy in India 
before its Nestlé campaign. 
In contrast, UNI by itself did not have any experience in India. Because UNI was a merger 
of four global unions,2 it incorporated each of the four unions’ affiliates (13 in number) in India 
into a UNI India Liaison Council (UNI-ILC) in 2001. UNI-ILC was an “instant alliance” formed 
without any prior experience of working together. Our interviews suggest that UNI struggled with 
building cohesiveness amongst the 13 Indian affiliates who automatically became part of UNI-
ILC. The affiliates differed in terms of their representation (blue versus white-collar workers), 
their strategy (business versus political unionism), and in terms of their political affiliations. 
Hence, we have a case of a GUF with no prior experience in India trying to pull together a plethora 
of different local organisations with varying experience into a cohesive whole. UNI-ILC’s 
president illustrated this problem in the following way: “To consolidate the power of a dozen 
affiliates representing diverse sectors and political ideologues3, we at UNI-ILC chose not to 
meddle with others’ work” (Interview UNI-3). Consequently, we noticed IUF’s relationship with 
its affiliates at the national space yielding a high degree of coalition power and ‘deliberative 
vitality’ (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013; Brookes, 2013). Hence, the role of ‘identity 
work’ (Greer and Hauptiemier, 2018) was sensed more by IUF activists who succeeded in a 
coordinated campaign. 
 
2 These are International Federation of Employees, technicians and managers [FIET], Communications International 
[CI], Media and Entertainment International [MEI], and International Graphical Federation [IGF]). 
3 CI & IGF brought politically affiliated federations. Majority with FIET and MEI were non-affiliated. 
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India Campaign Strategies: In 2007, the IUF-IOO alliance focused on three factories where the 
unions had not been recognised by Nestlé India.4 IUF-IOO formed the ‘Federation of All India 
Nestlé Employees’ (FAINE) in 2008 with the ‘right to negotiation’ as its primary agenda. With 
IUF-IOO support, a fourth Nestlé factory in Bicholim and a fifth factory in Pantnagar formed 
unions, but Nestlé did not recognise them. FAINE then launched a coordinated campaign to win 
recognition and bargaining rights in these five factories. Following a programme to educate 
workers about their rights and to train them in negotiations, FAINE drafted a charter of demands, 
including a demand for 25% rise in wages for 2009-10, which Nestlé rejected citing its policy of 
no negotiation with unions. Ground level organising commenced thereafter. At first FAINE drafted 
a 6-month action-plan under the IUF-IOO’s guidance. “As per the action plan, every factory union 
representative was required to visit each factory where a campaign is on, participate in gate-
meetings, and keep each other informed of the development at their own factories,” noted the IUF-
IOO’s TNC-Coordinator (Interview IUF-1).  A worker in the Pantnagar factory who remained very 
close to workplace action throughout noted: “IUF-IOO ensured that three to four union 
representatives from every factory appear in all meetings. Unions from coastal Goa though found 
it challenging, gathered at 5 am and 9 pm to meet the first- and night-shift workers in January in 
our plant located in the Northern hilly terrains that witness very harsh winter” (Interview IUF-3). 
Finally, on 25 May’09, approximately 400 workers from four factories assembled for a six-hour 
long demonstration in Nestlé-India’s headquarters. These local activities were linked by FAINE 
 
4 Union Recognition in India is not a subject of law, but by convention, under the Code of Discipline in Industry 
(1956). 
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to the IUF’s global “Stop Nespressure” campaign. IUF lodged an OECD guidelines complaint5 
against Nestlé Inc. on 11 May 2009 in Vevey in which the right to association in the Pantnagar 
factory and right to negotiation in four other factories were dominant issues. Eventually, in the 
presence of the UK-National Contact Person6 (UK-NCP) Nestlé agreed to negotiate with its Indian 
unions. Thus, both intense ground level organising combined with pressure at the international 
level forced management to change their view. Nestlé-India agreed to respect the right of 
association of Pantnagar factory workers where the union was recognised in Sept’09. They then 
signed five separate CBAs with unions in five factories. 
 In the UNI case, the campaign in India started with UNI-Global’s Property Service (UNI-
PS) division establishing the Indian Security Workers Organising Initiative (ISWOI). This was 
done in partnership with two national union federations. These were the Centre of Indian Trade 
Unions (CITU), affiliated to the Communist Party of India (Marxist) and the Congress party- 
affiliated Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC). Interestingly, both federations did not 
have prior experience in organising security workers. Given the sector’s size, ISWOI focused its’ 
efforts to organizing G4S workers in multiple cities in India.  
The initial focus of the campaign in India was to solicit the Indian government’s 
intervention, but realising that “the law enforcement machinery was not prepared to bring any 
regulatory changes immediately” (Interview UNI-Global Officer, UNI-1), ISWOI launched the 
 
5 The OECD Guidelines possess a unique complaint procedure (Specific Instance Procedure) that provides the means 
to actively attend to and potentially resolve conflicts between aggrieved communities and companies. 
(http://oecdwatch.org/filing-complaints, accessed on 27 Aug, 2015).   
6 UK-NCP for the OECD guidelines is an independent body responsible for raising awareness of the guidelines and 
implementing the OECD guidelines’ complaint mechanism. 
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‘Security for Security Workers’ campaign in India in November 2007. ISWOI met with the G4S 
India management in January 2008, to present their charter of eight demands. When management 
refused to negotiate, ISWOI focused on building grassroots support for eight key issues of 
importance to security workers. Meanwhile, at the global level, UNI-PS continued to focus on 
building solidarity that was an integral part of the global campaign. Although G4S India agreed to 
act favorably on the demands by April 2008, it did not do so.  Meanwhile close to five thousand 
guards who brought an action claiming unpaid overtime-wage were dismissed by G4S. The 
company threatened workers and ordered them to “stay away from trade union activities” 
(Interview UNI-5). This UNI-ILC’s state level organiser recollects, “The impact of our campaign 
was many guards started expressing their voice against the injustice. However, G4S threatened 
the union leaders. Many workers lost their jobs.” ISWOI appealed to court. The court decided in 
favour of security workers. Because G4S India management did not attend the conciliation process 
initiated by the labor department with regard to the charter of eight demands, ISWOI switched the 
focus of their campaign to pressurising G4S’s clients in India such as Axis-Bank, Indian Premier 
League (IPL), and several foreign embassies, who were, as per the law, the principal employers of 
G4S guards. “The focus was on pressuring G4S’s clients by leafleting, protesting at important 
events such as cricket matches in which the clients, such as IPL, was a sponsor, and otherwise 
targeting places where security guards worked to taint the reputation of ‘brand G4S’”, shared the 
general secretary of a UNI-ILC affiliate (Interview UNI-4). 
Yet, none of these tactics yielded results. The state level UNI-ILC organizer noted, “The 
company did not honor its promise, made by G4S India management in earlier discussions with 
ISWOI in January 2008, to conciliate on the eight outstanding issues by April 2008” (Interview 
UNI-5). A G4S security guard from Kochi said “In Kerala, after seven years of struggle we could 
 23 
not make the local G4S management to abide by the state government notification on payment of 
minimum wage to us” (Interview UNI-8). This sentiment was widely shared by most of the security 
guards that we interviewed. We learned from our conversations with security guards that in some 
cities G4S management had promised to issue letters of appointment to the guards and return their 
education certificates, as they had demanded, but the management delayed and later added these 
issues also to the matters pending conciliation. The UNI negotiated a GFA on 11 December 2008 
with G4S as a result of the intervention of the OECD’s appointed mediator7, which brought the 
global campaign to an end (Fichter et al 2011:71) and left the task of overseeing implementation 
of GFA with the country affiliates. However, local country affiliates have not been successful, 
since G4S India had not settled these issues at the time of our data collection.   
Campaign Coalition Structures: The intermediary structures created by the two campaigns differed 
quite systematically. The importance of making gains locally in different regions can be seen in 
IUF’s regional structure, where there is a disproportionate representation of developing country 
regions, permitting the country outreach offices to voice the importance of local priorities in 
engaging with the country’s multinational management (Garver et al., 2007). Local actors have 
considerable freedom under the IUF’s national outreach offices to launch local campaigns, which 
then feed into the IUF’s global campaigns. FAINE focused on weaving together disparate local 
organisations (unions, NGOs and social movements). In this particular case, the autonomy enjoyed 
by FAINE appears completely consistent with the ICEM-Sintracarbon case described before, and 
with McCullum’s notion that change must come from the global grassroots. 
 
7 Signing of the GFA resulted in G4S agreeing to ‘Ethical-Employment Partnership Agreement’ that provided G4S’s 
workers around the globe the right to organize. 
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In contrast, UNI’s coalition structures did not quite gain the same autonomy as those of the 
IUF. ISWOI was composed of CITU and INTUC, two federations with opposing political 
philosophies, who could not work together. “Fierce inter-union competition has guarded against 
solidarity in this camp” (Fichter and McCallum 2015:79). Thus, a significant amount of time was 
spent bringing the two ideologically different unions to create a cohesive identity. Although 
considerable autonomy was given to CITU and INTUC in their attempt to organise security guards 
in different cities, the intense inter-union rivalry required some degree of centralisation of 
decision-making at the campaign coordinator level. A G4S security guard who was part of the 
campaign under the INTUC suggested that “Distributing flyers with CITU logo was sufficient to 
offend the accord and CITU tried to interfere with our organizing work in Bangalore” (Interview 
UNI-6).  Other security guards also highlighted the problem of inter-union rivalry, which, as 
Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) have noted, is a common characteristic in Indian industrial relations.  
The campaign coordinators in India were from New Zealand, with limited understanding of the 
local context, reporting to SEIU’s officer overseeing the Indian campaign. Every move by ISWOI 
needed to be approved by UNI-PS8 . Consequently, unlike the IUF case, local affiliates’ concerns 
did not take centre stage in UNI’s global campaign strategy, which hewed closer to the top-down 
perspective highlighted by McCallum (2013). Although UNI’s global sectoral structure does 
incorporate sub-regional centres and national unions, their input into global campaigns appears to 
be limited. A senior UNI-Global officer (Interview UNI-1) held that “local affiliates decide their 
priorities, but that does not necessarily mean that the priorities are what UNI will support”. 
According to her, UNI would launch a regional campaign that meets affiliates interests, only when 
 
8Although UNI-APRO’s Regional Secretary argues that if UNI in Asia targets a multinational in a given sector, the 
GUF will launch a regional campaign by giving in to the local workers’ assessment (UNI-2).   
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its analyses regarding available staffing and resources indicate the possibility of winning, and 
when affiliates have a proven track record. In contrast to IUF where “horizontal embeddedness” 
(Levesque and Murray, 2010) was the norm, the UNI showed a much greater focus on “vertical 
embeddedness” given the inability of local unions to voice and implement local strategies that 
meet local needs. 
Campaign Tactics: FAINE harnessed local campaigning methods, tools, and tactics. “As you have 
noticed, the action plan was drawn by affiliate factory unions with only the technical support 
provided by IUF-IOO.......whether it was organising gate meetings or holding demonstration in 
front of head office, these ideas have originated from the coordination committee meetings of 
FAINE”, noted IUF-IOO’s TNC-Coordinator (Interview IUF-1). Techniques like the canteen 
boycott alongside running community kitchens (Sanjha Chulha) in multiple factories by workers’ 
spouses shows how IUF-IOO and FAINE acclimatised themselves with the local culture of 
collectivism in North India (where such tactics have been tried before). For example, a worker 
from Nestlé’s MOGA factory suggested, “In canteen boycott the day when food was ready to be 
served we boycotted and on the other day, when food was unprepared as management supposed 
that boycott is on, we demanded food. We were taking management by shock” (Interview IUF-4).   
In contrast, UNI’s G4S campaign in India was not based on prior learning or experiences 
in India, but based on its learning in the US. UNI’s coalition mostly applied campaign techniques 
proposed by UNI-PS or used methods that were employed in similar campaigns in the services 
sector by UNI-Global. This centralisation was in part due to UNI’s goal of signing a GFA with 
G4S. As UNI-ILC’s President suggested, “sine qua non of bringing G4S within an ambit of 
dialogue and compel G4S to sign GFA at the end of the campaign, which UNI has tried with a 
dozen similar corporations in past”. (Interview UNI-3).  McCallum (2013:133-134) points out that 
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“The unions such as PGSU began to shift its recruitment process under the influence of UNI to 
focus on strategic mapping, one-to-one meetings with guards, and data collection, all elements of 
the North American ‘organising model’. Guards who were part of the campaign were organised 
under the banner of the two national federations, CITU and INTUC.  Even the ground level 
organising by both federations followed the ‘US-style model of organising and campaigning with 
strategic plans, one-on-one conversations with guards at work sites and homes, and data 
collection”. Workplace interviews confirmed that the guards gradually realised that “their” 
campaign was headed not by their own leaders, but by SEIU organizers and the two campaign 
coordinators from New Zealand. Although ISWOI leaders had bought into the SEIU campaign 
governance structure, some security guards told us that they were reluctant to engage in campaigns 
under the guidance of foreigners. Other guards indicated difficulty in following campaign rules set 
by UNI and SEIU without their own input into campaign decisions. A security guard campaigning 
under the CITU banner in Kolkata suggested, “The organisers were almost teaching us how to run 
a campaign, as if we are campaigning for the first time in our life”, (Interview UNI-7). Therefore, 
the effectiveness of the power strategy, which so heavily depends on contextual appropriateness 
(Brookes, 2013), was evidenced in IUF’s campaign but not in UNI’s.  
Post Campaign Activities: The IUF stopped its campaign and withdrew its OECD complaint once 
Nestlé signed CBAs with its workers in various factories in India, but FAINE continues to organise 
new factories, and the IUF continues to expand its activities in India, including in Nestlé. The 
ISWOI was dismantled after the GFA was signed in 2008 in the UNI case, leaving local unions, 
who faced numerous barriers in organising G4S guards, to fend for themselves using the GFA. 
UNI’s chosen affiliates in India did not have the organisational strength, nor enough of a voice in 
the global campaign structure, to effectively organise security guards. This may be due to UNI’s 
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belief that “affiliates in the selected countries do not necessarily have to be powerful in their own 
countries to join a UNI led alliance” (Evans, 2014: 270). 
Discussion and Conclusions 
What do we learn from this contextualised comparison regarding the role of campaign governance 
in the two cases in this paper? First, the cases illustrate the debates and conjectures identified in 
prior literature regarding the tensions between centralisation and decentralisation in global 
campaigns. We find that the two campaigns strike different balances between global and local 
goals. The UNI campaign instituted strategies and structures that permitted it to achieve global 
goals. The IUF case suggests that campaigns have to be locally inspired, because when local 
workers and their unions are actively involved in campaign decisions, they are far more able to 
enhance their bargaining power in a local setting. As our description of the two campaigns 
indicates, the IUF’s campaign in India comports more with the ideals of the “new labour 
transnationalism” identified in the literature. 
 Second, these cases permit us to make two contributions to extant theory regarding the role 
of campaign governance. The first of these contributions is that there is a need for internal 
consistency across different campaign elements for success. As our cases demonstrate, both 
campaigns illustrate such a consistency. The UNI’s campaign focused on the global goal of signing 
a GFA. It exhibited centrally determined strategies to achieve that goal. UNI created campaign 
coalition structures where decisions were taken by global rather than local officers, embraced 
campaign and organising tactics that were based on global (US) experiences, despite the 
uneasiness of local workers with that model, and UNI concluded the campaign when the global 
goal was achieved. Their campaign thus exhibits a degree of ‘vertical embeddedness’. In contrast, 
the IUF’s campaign was based on a conception that transnational labour solidarity would be best 
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served by making local improvements. It adopted strategies based on the local terrain, created 
more coordinated coalition structures that permitted the local voices to dominate in the global 
campaign, followed local tactics that were home-grown, and was ultimately more enduring. The 
coalition structures such as FAINE continued to work to organise and improve collective 
bargaining throughout the dairy supply chain locally. IUF’s campaign exhibits characteristics of 
‘horizontal embeddedness’ alluded to by Levesque and Murray (2010). But both campaigns 
demonstrate an internal consistency amongst the different elements in a campaign that is a likely 
pre-requisite to constructing transnational solidarity.  
Our second contribution concerns notions of success in labour transnationalism. Although 
success was conceptualised by Brookes (2013) as at least one party in the coalition making material 
or strategic gains, we ask the question of what the purpose of transnational solidarity might be, 
especially between workers in the Global North and South. Transnationalism between labour 
actors in developed countries where labour is firmly institutionalised is a necessary issue, to be 
sure, but hardly sufficient in creating a global labour movement. If success in transnational labour 
alliances were to be reconceptualised as the need to strengthen workers and unions in the Global 
South, there is a clear imperative for local participation in global decisions, in ways that overcome 
the democratic deficit in global labour governance that Niforou (2014) highlights. This deficit is 
more apparent in the UNI campaign relative to the IUF’s where local interests, strategies, and 
tactics assumed center stage. Thus, we argue that campaigns, whether “born global” or “born local” 
must be articulated at the local level in ways that meet the interests of local workers, not just the 
strategic interests of the GUF, if we are to see sustainable improvements in union power and 
collective bargaining at the local level in the Global South. 
While we have presented a plausible argument that campaign governance matters, and that 
 29 
local participation in global campaigns is key to local success, we cannot ignore alternate 
explanations that could account for the different local results we see in these two campaigns. The 
two industries in which the campaigns were conducted produce different challenges for union 
organising. It is generally easier to organise factory workers working in an industrially-bounded 
location, relative to security guards who work in dispersed locations. Furthermore, labour law 
protections for factory workers are generally stronger in India than for contracted workers. Inter-
union rivalry amongst UNI affiliates was also a problem. All these could have precluded the UNI 
from obtaining local organising successes. But, on the other hand, it is clear that the UNI’s goals 
were to obtain a GFA, and the way that UNI organised its global campaign, with limited 
involvement of local actors in campaign strategies, structures, and tactics, was partially responsible 
for the lack of positive local outcomes. Thus, we have made the case for a plausible argument 
regarding the role of campaign governance in local success of labour transnationalism, but call for 
more research on the relative impacts of contextual variables and campaign governance variables. 
We hope future research will take up this challenge. To conclude, we studied two global campaigns 
and how they were articulated locally in India, adding to the limited empirical stock of literature 
on the local effects of global campaigns. We argue that there is a need for internal consistency 
across the campaigns for campaign success, but we also argue that constructing global labour 
solidarity requires campaign governance efforts that meet the interests of workers in the Global 
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Appendix 1: Interviews  
Key Interviews cited in the paper 
1. UNI-1: UNI Global Union’s Senior Official 
2. IUF-1: Transnational Corporation Coordinator of IUF-IOO 
3. IUF-2: IUF-IOO’s National Officer of Supply Chain  
4. UNI-2: UNI-APRO Regional Secretary 
5. UNI-3: UNI-ILC President 
6. UNI-4: UNITES Professional Secretary (UNITES is one of the oldest affiliates of UNI in 
India) 
7. UNI-5: State level UNI-ILC Organiser 
8. UNI-6: G4S Security Guard from Bangalore 
9. UNI-7: G4S Security Guard from Kolkata 
10. UNI-8: G4S Security Guard from Kochi 
11. IUF-3: Local worker from Nestle’s Pantnagar plant 
12. IUF-4: Local worker from Nestle’s Mogha plant   
 
Details of All Interviewees 
Interviewees IUF UNI 
Senior Officials 
of GUF 
Former IUF Global Officer (for dairy, 
plantation and beverage sectors in 
Global South) 
Deputy General Secretary, 
UNI Global Union 




by GUFs in India  
1. Officer, Asia-Pacific Regional 
Office, IUF 
2. Former General Secretary, 
Hindustan Lever Employees’ Union 
(IUF affiliate) 
3. Asia-Pacific Coordinator, IUF 
1. Officer, SEIU 
(responsible for ‘security 
for security’ campaign 
rollout in India) 
2. Regional Secretary, 
UNI-APRO 
3. Director, UNIDOC. 
Union activists 1. FAINE representative (national 
level working with IUF-IOO and 
DEFOI) 
2. Key campaigners at Pantnagar and 
Mogha factories of Nestle 
3. Organizer studying conditions of 
contract farmers producing barley 
for SABMiller. 
1. Member, FDI-Watch 
2. Organiser, ISWOI 
3. Office bearer, INTUC 
and CITU.  
Worker 
representatives 
Two representatives of FAINE from the 
Pantnagar and Mogha factories of 
Nestle 
 
Representative of ISWOI 




1. Secretary, PBKMS (IUF affiliate) 
2. Associate, IUF-IOO (organising 
informal sector women workers in 
collaboration with WEIGO) 
3. Senior official, Hotel Employees 
Federation of India 
1. Deputy General 
Secretary, National 
Postal Organization 
2. Secretary, UNITES 
Professional 





1. Transnational Corporation 
Coordinator, IUF-IOO 
2. Senior official, Dairy Employees 
Federation of India 
3. IUF-IOO’s National Officer for 
Supply Chain 
4. IUF-IOO’s National Officer for 
Hotel and Restaurant 
1. President, UNI-ILC 
2. Vice President, UNI-ILC  
3. National Coordinator, 
ISWOI 
4. State level organiser, 
UNI-ILC 
Country experts 1. Two officials of Solidarity Centre, AFL-CIO, Washington 
2. A veteran trade unionist attempting to consolidate union power by 
bringing independent unions that are NOT affiliated to political 
parties together. 
3. A veteran trade unionist, a member of the India’s tripartite body, 
The Indian Labour Conference, and with expertise in organizing 




Appendix 2: Abbreviations 
1. CBA – Collective Bargaining Agreement 
2. CI – Communications International 
3. CITU – Centre of Indian Trade Unions 
4. ER – Employee Relations 
5. EWC – European Works Council 
6. FAINE – Federation of All India Nestlé Employees 
7. FIET – International Federation of Employees, Technicians and Managers 
8. G4S – Group Four Securicor Plc 
9. GFA – Global Framework Agreement 
10. GUF – Global Union Federations 
11. HLEU – Hindustan Lever Employees Union 
12. ICEM – International Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine and General Workers' Unions 
13. IFA – International Framework Agreement 
14. IGF – International Graphical Federation 
15. INTUC – Indian National Trade Union Congress 
16. IPL – Indian Premier League 
17. ISWOI – Indian Security Workers Organising Initiative 
18. IUF – International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco and 
Allied Workers’ Associations 
19. IUF-IOO – IUF-India Outreach Office 
20. MEI – Media and Entertainment International 
21. MNC – Multinational Corporation 
22. NGO – Non-governmental Organisation 
23. OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
24. PGSU – Private Security Guard Union (Bangalore based affiliate of ISWOI) 
25. PBKMS – Paschim Banga Khet Mazoor Samiti (IUF affiliate from agriculture sector in India) 
26. SEIU – Service Employees International Union 
27. TNC – Transnational Corporation 
28. UK-NCP – United Kingdom National Contact Person 
29. UNI – Union Global Union formerly known as Union Network International 
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30. UNI-ILC – UNI Global Union India Liaison Council 
31. UNI-PS – UNI Global Union’s Property Service 
